[[{"content_id":421983,"content_number":0,"portal_id":2,"lang_id":"en","content_title":"Al-Aqsa Flood and the beginning of Israel's strategic erosion","content_rtitr":"","content_short_title":null,"content_summary":"Three years after Al-Aqsa Storm, Zionist regime has inflicted massive damage across the region, but has yet to achieve a single lasting political victory, raising doubts about its strategic direction.","content_summary_fill":1,"content_body":"\r\nThree years after the Al-Aqsa Storm operation, the importance of this operation cannot be summarized only in its military dimensions. October 7, 2023, was a point that changed a set of security, political, and media equations in West Asia. This operation occurred under conditions in which the Palestine issue, after years of the siege of Gaza, the occupation of Palestinian territories, the expansion of settlements, and the intensification of pressure on Palestinians, was moving away from the priorities of regional and international policy. The process of normalization of relations between some Arab countries and the Zionist regime had also strengthened the impression that the Palestine issue could be marginalized without a root solution. Al-Aqsa Storm stopped this process and brought Palestine back to the center of West Asian developments.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThe first blow was struck against Israel's security image. For years, Tel Aviv had built an important part of its power on a combination of intelligence superiority, technology, the separation wall, surveillance systems, and military capability, and presented this set as the guarantor of the security of the settlements and residents of the occupied territories. But October 7 showed that even such an extensive network cannot create absolute security. More importantly, Israel's internal reports and investigations subsequently revealed serious weaknesses in the performance of the security and military structure. Therefore, the issue was not just the infiltration of Palestinian forces into areas under Israeli control; rather, it was a blow to public trust in the regime's ability to provide security.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nTel Aviv's response to this failure was a widespread war against Gaza. Israel announced big objectives such as destroying Hamas, returning the captives, and creating a new security reality. But the main problem from the very beginning was the gap between the announced objectives and the possibility of their realization. The widespread and destructive war was able to inflict heavy damage on Gaza, but it did not eliminate the political issue of Palestine. Hamas was not removed from the Palestine equation, and the future of Gaza, the manner of governance, the issue of disarmament of the Resistance groups, and even the shape of Israel's relationship with this region still face serious questions.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThis is precisely where the concept of "military victory" separates from "strategic victory." An army may destroy a large part of the opposing side's infrastructure, but if it cannot shape the post-war political conditions in accordance with its objectives, military victory does not necessarily turn into strategic victory. The Gaza experience has highlighted this contradiction precisely. Israel was able to employ an enormous level of its military power, but it still faces an issue that existed before the war as well: how can the Palestine issue be solved merely through military means?\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThis pattern is also observable on the Lebanon front. Israel dealt heavy blows to Hezbollah, but could not remove this movement from Lebanon's political and security equations. The return of clashes in 2026 also showed that even inflicting considerable damage on a military actor does not necessarily mean the end of the threat or a permanent change in the balance. Regarding Iran as well, direct attacks by Israel and America could not remove Tehran from regional equations. On the contrary, direct confrontation highlighted the importance of Iran's missile capability, strategic depth, and regional capacity more than before in the security calculations of West Asia.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nFrom this perspective, one can speak of a cycle: after October 7, Israel entered war to restore deterrence; the war expanded; but the wider the scope of the conflict became, the more the military, economic, political, and diplomatic costs increased, and on the other hand, the main objectives still faced serious obstacles. In other words, the attempt to compensate for one security failure itself led to a set of new crises.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nOne of the most important consequences of this process was the return of the Palestine issue to the center of world public opinion. Images and reports related to the situation in Gaza, widespread protests in various countries, and increasing political pressures on Israel caused an issue that, before October 7, had been affected by the normalization process in many regional equations, to once again become one of the main topics of international politics. The move by a number of countries toward recognizing Palestine and the increase in disagreement between Israel and some of its Western allies showed that the diplomatic cost of the war for Tel Aviv is also increasing.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nInside occupied Palestine as well, the effects of this erosion have become apparent. The security failure of October 7 intensified the dispute over responsibility for it and exposed the performance of Benjamin Netanyahu and the ruling political structure to criticism more than before. The issue of captives, the continuation or cessation of the war, the future of Gaza, the economic costs of the conflict, and social and political divisions revealed fissures that had existed before but gained greater depth after the war. In this way, Israel was trying to rebuild its image of power and cohesion while simultaneously facing a crisis of internal trust and increasing political pressures.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nEven at the regional level, the image has changed. Before October 7, the process of normalization of Israel's relations with some Arab countries could create the impression that the Palestine issue was no longer the main obstacle to the formation of a new regional order. But the Gaza war, and then the expansion of conflicts to Lebanon, Syria, and other places, made this process more complicated. The Palestine issue once again became one of the important criteria of Arab public opinion for evaluating Israel's policies and increased the political cost of approaching Tel Aviv.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nTherefore, three years after Al-Aqsa Storm, perhaps the most important question is not how much damage Israel has inflicted on various battlefields; the more important question is whether it has been able to achieve its political objectives. The answer to this question is negative.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nAl-Aqsa Storm was a turning point because it showed that the Palestine issue cannot be solved by setting it aside from regional equations. Israel entered a widespread war to restore deterrence, but this war not only did not eliminate the Palestine issue, but brought it back to the center of the world's attention, increased Israel's political and diplomatic costs, made its internal fissures more apparent, and dragged the scope of the confrontation to multiple fronts.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nThree years later, therefore, one can speak of a "cycle of failure"; a cycle in which a security failure was answered with war, the war led to erosion, and the erosion created new crises. Perhaps the most important legacy of October 7 is this: Israel showed that it has the ability to inflict very extensive military blows, but it has not yet been able to establish a link between this military power and a lasting political victory. And as long as this gap exists, the end of every war can be the beginning of the next crisis.","content_html":"


\r\nThree years after the Al-Aqsa Storm operation, the importance of this operation cannot be summarized only in its military dimensions. October 7, 2023, was a point that changed a set of security, political, and media equations in West Asia. This operation occurred under conditions in which the Palestine issue, after years of the siege of Gaza, the occupation of Palestinian territories, the expansion of settlements, and the intensification of pressure on Palestinians, was moving away from the priorities of regional and international policy. The process of normalization of relations between some Arab countries and the Zionist regime had also strengthened the impression that the Palestine issue could be marginalized without a root solution. Al-Aqsa Storm stopped this process and brought Palestine back to the center of West Asian developments.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n

 <\/p>\r\n\r\n

The first blow was struck against Israel's security image. For years, Tel Aviv had built an important part of its power on a combination of intelligence superiority, technology, the separation wall, surveillance systems, and military capability, and presented this set as the guarantor of the security of the settlements and residents of the occupied territories. But October 7 showed that even such an extensive network cannot create absolute security. More importantly, Israel's internal reports and investigations subsequently revealed serious weaknesses in the performance of the security and military structure. Therefore, the issue was not just the infiltration of Palestinian forces into areas under Israeli control; rather, it was a blow to public trust in the regime's ability to provide security.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n

 <\/p>\r\n\r\n

Tel Aviv's response to this failure was a widespread war against Gaza. Israel announced big objectives such as destroying Hamas, returning the captives, and creating a new security reality. But the main problem from the very beginning was the gap between the announced objectives and the possibility of their realization. The widespread and destructive war was able to inflict heavy damage on Gaza, but it did not eliminate the political issue of Palestine. Hamas was not removed from the Palestine equation, and the future of Gaza, the manner of governance, the issue of disarmament of the Resistance groups, and even the shape of Israel's relationship with this region still face serious questions.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n

 <\/p>\r\n\r\n

This is precisely where the concept of "military victory" separates from "strategic victory." An army may destroy a large part of the opposing side's infrastructure, but if it cannot shape the post-war political conditions in accordance with its objectives, military victory does not necessarily turn into strategic victory. The Gaza experience has highlighted this contradiction precisely. Israel was able to employ an enormous level of its military power, but it still faces an issue that existed before the war as well: how can the Palestine issue be solved merely through military means?<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n

 <\/p>\r\n\r\n

This pattern is also observable on the Lebanon front. Israel dealt heavy blows to Hezbollah, but could not remove this movement from Lebanon's political and security equations. The return of clashes in 2026 also showed that even inflicting considerable damage on a military actor does not necessarily mean the end of the threat or a permanent change in the balance. Regarding Iran as well, direct attacks by Israel and America could not remove Tehran from regional equations. On the contrary, direct confrontation highlighted the importance of Iran's missile capability, strategic depth, and regional capacity more than before in the security calculations of West Asia.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n

 <\/p>\r\n\r\n

From this perspective, one can speak of a cycle: after October 7, Israel entered war to restore deterrence; the war expanded; but the wider the scope of the conflict became, the more the military, economic, political, and diplomatic costs increased, and on the other hand, the main objectives still faced serious obstacles. In other words, the attempt to compensate for one security failure itself led to a set of new crises.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n

 <\/p>\r\n\r\n

One of the most important consequences of this process was the return of the Palestine issue to the center of world public opinion. Images and reports related to the situation in Gaza, widespread protests in various countries, and increasing political pressures on Israel caused an issue that, before October 7, had been affected by the normalization process in many regional equations, to once again become one of the main topics of international politics. The move by a number of countries toward recognizing Palestine and the increase in disagreement between Israel and some of its Western allies showed that the diplomatic cost of the war for Tel Aviv is also increasing.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n

 <\/p>\r\n\r\n

Inside occupied Palestine as well, the effects of this erosion have become apparent. The security failure of October 7 intensified the dispute over responsibility for it and exposed the performance of Benjamin Netanyahu and the ruling political structure to criticism more than before. The issue of captives, the continuation or cessation of the war, the future of Gaza, the economic costs of the conflict, and social and political divisions revealed fissures that had existed before but gained greater depth after the war. In this way, Israel was trying to rebuild its image of power and cohesion while simultaneously facing a crisis of internal trust and increasing political pressures.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n

 <\/p>\r\n\r\n

Even at the regional level, the image has changed. Before October 7, the process of normalization of Israel's relations with some Arab countries could create the impression that the Palestine issue was no longer the main obstacle to the formation of a new regional order. But the Gaza war, and then the expansion of conflicts to Lebanon, Syria, and other places, made this process more complicated. The Palestine issue once again became one of the important criteria of Arab public opinion for evaluating Israel's policies and increased the political cost of approaching Tel Aviv.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n

 <\/p>\r\n\r\n

Therefore, three years after Al-Aqsa Storm, perhaps the most important question is not how much damage Israel has inflicted on various battlefields; the more important question is whether it has been able to achieve its political objectives. The answer to this question is negative.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n

 <\/p>\r\n\r\n

Al-Aqsa Storm was a turning point because it showed that the Palestine issue cannot be solved by setting it aside from regional equations. Israel entered a widespread war to restore deterrence, but this war not only did not eliminate the Palestine issue, but brought it back to the center of the world's attention, increased Israel's political and diplomatic costs, made its internal fissures more apparent, and dragged the scope of the confrontation to multiple fronts.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n

 <\/p>\r\n\r\n

Three years later, therefore, one can speak of a "cycle of failure"; a cycle in which a security failure was answered with war, the war led to erosion, and the erosion created new crises. Perhaps the most important legacy of October 7 is this: Israel showed that it has the ability to inflict very extensive military blows, but it has not yet been able to establish a link between this military power and a lasting political victory. And as long as this gap exists, the end of every war can be the beginning of the next crisis.<\/span><\/p>","content_source":"","content_url":"","content_date_start":"2026-10-08 20:15:24","content_date_event":"2026-10-08 20:15:24","content_date_event_start":null,"content_date_event_end":null,"content_show_title_slider":1,"content_date_last_edit":"2026-10-08 20:17:17","content_date_register":"2026-10-08 20:17:17","content_columns":0,"content_show_img":1,"content_show_details":0,"content_show_related_img":0,"content_show_slider":1,"content_comment":1,"content_score":0,"tag_id":0,"score_average":null,"score_count":null,"score_date_last":null,"uid":43,"eid":0,"attach_title":"Al-Aqsa Flood and the beginning of Israel's strategic erosion","attaches":[{"sizes":{"150":".\/cache\/2\/attach\/202610\/575256_4284336708_150_100.webp","300":".\/cache\/2\/attach\/202610\/575256_4284336708_300_200.webp","400":".\/cache\/2\/attach\/202610\/575256_4284336708_400_267.webp","600":".\/cache\/2\/attach\/202610\/575256_4284336708_600_400.jpg","900":".\/cache\/2\/attach\/202610\/575256_4284336708_600_400.jpg","1200":".\/cache\/2\/attach\/202610\/575256_4284336708_600_400.jpg"},"ext":"jpg","file_media":1,"token":4284336708,"files":{"original":{"url":".\/file\/2\/attach\/202610\/575256_4284336708.jpg","width":600,"height":400,"size":0}}}]}]]