The Strategic Turning Point: How Iran Emerged as the Persian Gulf's New Hegemon

Tehran, Qodsna –Gordon Duff, former UN Diplomat, former U.S. military official, Advisor to The Intel Drop, senior editor of Veterans Today and military analyst in an exclusive article for the Qods News Agency wrote about the violation of the ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon, upcoming election in Zionist regime and the U.S.-Israeli illegal war on Iran. 

Introduction: The Irony of War

There is a particular irony—the kind that history savors—in the fact that the United States and Israel set out in February 2026 to destroy Iran as a regional power and instead ended up cementing its dominance. This is not a paradox; it is a pattern. Anyone who has paid attention to American foreign policy in the Middle East over the past three decades will recognize it immediately .

Iran has emerged from the 2026 war not as a broken state but as the preeminent power in the Persian Gulf . The mullahs whom Donald Trump promised to sweep from the stage have been replaced, yes—but by a harder, younger, more capable military leadership that has shed the theological defensiveness of the founding generation and adopted the cold strategic calculus of a state that knows it survived, and knows what it survived .

This is not the Iran that signed the JCPOA. This is an Iran that has been to war and won.

Part I: The Ceasefire Violations—A Pattern of Broken Promises

Despite ceasefire agreements in Gaza and Lebanon, the Zionist regime continues to violate the terms with impunity. According to reporting from Al Khaleej, since the Gaza ceasefire agreement in October 2025, Israel has not stopped launching airstrikes and artillery shelling on cities, towns, camps, and displaced persons' tents throughout the Strip . Since the Lebanon ceasefire agreement on November 27, 2024, and the "framework agreement" of June 26, 2026, the Israeli military has not ceased attacks on what it describes as threats to its forces in southern Lebanon .

The pattern is unmistakable: Israel signs ceasefires, then breaks them. It expands its military operations in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, using the cover of "self-defense" to justify what is, in reality, a campaign of territorial expansion ahead of its October 27 election .

In Syria, despite announced talks under the auspices of U.S. envoy Tom Barrack to calm the situation and avoid escalation, Israel continues to launch airstrikes on military facilities—even those outside service—and conduct incursions into Syrian towns and villages .

The scale of destruction is staggering. Israeli forces now control 60 percent of Gaza's territory, drawing a "yellow line" to secure settlements around the Strip. Northern Gaza areas like Jabalia and Beit Hanoun have been turned into wasteland. All agricultural land has been destroyed . In Lebanon, satellite imagery confirms that at least 46 of 54 towns and villages within Israel's self-declared "yellow line" in southern Lebanon have suffered extensive destruction or been largely razed .

The Israeli Ministry of War proudly announced in July 2026 the destruction of all buildings in 24 Lebanese villages, bringing the total of completely demolished homes to over 20,000 . Oxfam confirmed that Israel's ongoing invasion in Lebanon, its destructive occupation of Palestinian territory, ground incursion and airstrikes in Syria, its continued attacks in Gaza, and violent attacks and territorial expansion in the West Bank have continued despite the provisional cessation of violence with Iran .

The Israeli goal is clear: the elimination of life in the "yellow line" zone in southern Lebanon, in Gaza, in the West Bank, and in southern Syria—including people, land, stone, and livelihoods—so that Israel's life and prosperity can exist alongside barren, empty land .

Part II: Netanyahu's Election Gamble—The Desperation of a Leader

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is seeking reelection with his legacy on the line. An Oct. 27 vote will largely serve as a referendum on his nearly uninterrupted 17-year rule and his handling of a turbulent period marked by mass protests, Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023 attacks, and nearly three years of war .

But Netanyahu's biggest threat may come from within his own political base. A series of small, pro-Netanyahu parties are competing in the run-up to the vote, but instead of strengthening the Israeli leader, these parties—including hard-line blocs led by polarizing Cabinet ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich—risk weakening his chances for reelection by splitting the vote among Netanyahu's base .

The math is unforgiving. Parties that receive the most votes secure the most seats in the 120-member parliament, but any party that can muster just 3.25 percent of the vote wins representation. This means that more than a dozen parties can be part of any given parliament. No single party has ever captured the parliamentary majority needed to form a government; instead, a party leader must form a coalition with smaller partners to secure a 61-seat majority .

If any of the smaller hard-line parties fail to enter parliament, their votes would be lost, and Netanyahu's reelection prospects would dim significantly. The failure of small parties to cross the threshold contributed to Netanyahu's defeat in a 2021 election, while rivalries among his opponents led to Netanyahu's return to power in 2022 .

Recent polls show Netanyahu's coalition at 51 seats—its strongest point since May—but still short of the 61 needed for a majority . The gap is narrowing between Netanyahu and his rivals: former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot is supported by 48 percent of respondents as most suitable for prime minister compared to 39 percent for Netanyahu, and former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett is also viewed as more suitable than Netanyahu, 43 percent to 39 percent .

With his legacy on the line, Netanyahu is imploring his erstwhile allies to unite into larger parties that have a better chance of entering parliament. "When we unite, we win. When we split up, we lose," Netanyahu told Channel 14, a TV station that serves as an unofficial mouthpiece for the prime minister .

But the divisions are deep. Two parties that ran together in the 2022 elections—Smotrich's Religious Zionism and Ben-Gvir's Jewish Power—have so far rejected Netanyahu's calls to merge again due to rocky relations between the two men. Smaller parties led by former Likud members and a hard-line retired military general find themselves competing for the same voters, differentiated more by personalities than ideologies .

Netanyahu's warning to his base is increasingly alarmist: "The left is ready," he said. "If we don't unite, we will lose" .

Part III: The Failed War Against Iran—A Strategic Victory for Tehran

The evidence is overwhelming: the United States and Israel have failed to achieve their goals in the illegal war against Iran. In return, Iran has emerged as a regional power, and its strength is now undeniable.

Danny Citrinowicz, a senior researcher at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, writing in Israel Hayom, acknowledged that the war against Iran failed and did not achieve its objectives . He emphasized that the war not only failed to weaken or destabilize Iran but ultimately strengthened Tehran's economic, political, and security standing .

The Israeli analyst pointed to Washington's declining appetite for a new military confrontation with Iran, arguing that the failure of the campaign reflects the collapse of Israel's strategy toward Iran—a strategy based on sustained pressure and close coordination with the United States .

Citrinowicz further wrote that this setback could have significant implications for Israel's future ability to shape U.S. policy on Iran. Iran could secure substantial economic benefits in exchange for limited concessions, including maintaining the normal flow of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, without relinquishing its strategic assets such as its missile capabilities, support for regional allies, or its right to enrich uranium .

Crucially, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf have not distanced themselves from Iran. Instead, they are seeking to preserve and even expand their ties with Tehran. As a result, prospects for expanding the Abraham Accords and further normalization with Israel have faced serious challenges .

Israel is now more isolated than ever on the issue of Iran and remains the only actor still insisting on the effectiveness of a military option to bring about fundamental change in the Islamic Republic . It's cities stand destroyed, hundreds of thousands are homeless and likely hundreds, possibly thousands dead, unreported, 'big lie' censorship to allow continued military aggression while the stolen Jewish homeland is shredded.

Part IV: Iran's Strength—A New Hegemon in the Persian Gulf

So how do we assess Iran's strength? The answer is clear: Iran has emerged from the 2026 war as the preeminent power in the Persian Gulf .

Iran won in the sense that matters strategically: it preserved the regime, demonstrated the resilience of its military and industrial capacity, neutralized the political will of its adversaries to continue the campaign, and emerged with enhanced legitimacy at home and elevated prestige across the region .

Consider the evidence:

Military Resilience: Iran survived the decapitation attempt. It reconstituted its missile forces faster than anticipated. It now, in practical terms, controls the Strait of Hormuz in a way that gives it leverage over the global economy that no amount of American naval presence can easily negate .

Strategic Adaptation: During the U.S.-Israeli war, Iran chose to largely rely on its own missiles, drones, and control over the Strait of Hormuz rather than unleash the full force of its "axis of resistance." This exposed the limits of its forward defense doctrine but accelerated a shift toward homeland-based deterrence. Iran's long-range missiles, inexpensive drones, and leverage over the Strait of Hormuz became the new centerpieces of its defense strategy .

Economic Potential: The memorandum of understanding signed between the United States and Iran includes lifting a U.S. naval blockade and establishing a $300 billion reconstruction fund for Iran . This fundamentally alters the geopolitical landscape and represents a strategic setback for Washington's initial war aims, effectively abandoning the goal of regime change .

Regional Recognition: The framework signals a potential end to Israeli ambitions of uncontested regional hegemony, with the U.S. implicitly recognizing Iran as a legitimate regional power .

Leadership Renewal: The mullahs whom Trump promised to sweep from the stage have been replaced by a harder, younger, more capable military leadership that has shed the theological defensiveness of the founding generation .

The Persian Gulf Arab states understood Iran's resilience. They denied Washington access to their airspace and made their opposition to the war unusually public. They live next door to Iran. They know that a post-war Iran would still be there in the morning, and that they would have to negotiate the terms of their coexistence with it long after the American aircraft carriers had sailed home .

Part V: The Miscalculations—A Failure of Judgment

The miscalculations that produced this outcome were not intelligence failures in the narrow sense. The intelligence was, by most accounts, reasonably accurate about Iran's military capabilities, the robustness of its dispersed missile infrastructure, and the IRGC's preparations for a prolonged campaign .

The failure was political and strategic—a failure of judgment at the highest levels, rooted in the same magical thinking that sent American troops into Baghdad in 2003 expecting to be greeted with flowers .

Washington convinced itself that Iran's restraint in 2024 and 2025 was evidence of weakness. It was evidence of patience .

American credibility with Persian Gulf partners has been severely damaged—not because America launched a war, but because it launched a war over their explicit objections, inflicted collateral economic damage on them through Hormuz disruptions and insurance premium explosions, and then failed to achieve the objectives it promised would justify the exercise .

Conclusion: The New Reality

The United States and Israel set out to destroy Iran as a regional power and instead ended up cementing its dominance .

Israel is now more isolated than ever on the issue of Iran . The U.S. has demonstrated that it is an unpredictable partner whose grand strategic commitments are subject to the enthusiasms of whatever administration happens to be in office . The hegemon that the United States sought to destroy, it created .

The question remains: Is Washington capable of learning from this catastrophe? History suggests otherwise.